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Democracy is a precondition for membership in the European Union. 
What are the chances for democracy in the jx>st-Communist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe? The first section states arguments of doubters; the second and 
third present fresh empirical evidence from nationwide surveys of public opinion 
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Survey data shows widespread popular support for the current regime 
as against the old Communist regime, and no substantial support for 
undemocratic alternatives. The critical feature of ex-Communists is that they are 
now "ex". Given that the democratic precondition 's  met, the paper secondly 
considers: What are the obstacles to enlargement within post-Communist
countries? In Central and Eastern Europe the chief obstacle i required
to create all the institutions of the market. Within the European Union there is 
also an obstacle, defining the post-1996 acquis communitaire. a task made more 





























































































The Baltic Sea is just as much a European one as the 
Mediterranean. It is quite simply intolerable for us to adopt the 
attitude that we want to create some sort of closed shop.
Helmut Kohl, on enlargement of the European Union (Bridge,
1994)
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union have transformed the map 
of Europe. Politics no longer imposes artificial divisions upon geography. Prior 
to 1945 Prague, Budapest and Warsaw were just as much European cities as 
Rome, Madrid and Lisbon. The 1995 expansion of the Union plus German re­
unification has moved the Union's centre of gravity well to the east of Brussels. 
Austria shares boundaries with four former Communist states—the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia—and Germany shares boundaries with 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as incorporating 16 million former 
citizens of a Communist party-state. The Baltic states of Sweden and Finland are 
geographically closer to Warsaw and St. Petersburg than to Brussels. As 
Chancellor Kohl’s remark emphasizes, Central Europe is once again central in 
European politics.
The enlargement of the European Union is an ongoing process. Since 
foundation, it has more than doubled in number of member states and greatly 
increased its cultural, social and economic heterogeneity  ̂The Maastricht Treaty 1 




























































































State may apply to become a Member of the Union'. The EU has now recognized 
six countries as candidates for membership--the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania have been given a special status as potential applicants for 
membership, and Slovenia too has a special status.
The EU, unlike the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, 
has a political criterion for membership, democracy. In the Mediterranean, the 
Union saw membership as a means of reinforcing the process of democratization 
there. Instead of waiting a generation or more for overwhelming evidence that 
democracy was fully institutionalized, Greece was admitted seven years after it 
adopted a democratic constitution and Spain and Portugal little more than a 
decade after the collapse of long-lived authoritarian regimes. On such a 
timetable, post-Communist regimes could start entering the European Union 
around the end of this decade.
What chance is there for democracy in post-Communist states of Central 
and Eastern Europe today? A glance at the past would suggest that the answer is 
'very little', since before becoming Communist most were ruled by conservative, 
military or populist authoritarian regimes, and some sided with the Axis in the 
Second World War. But who would have thought half a century ago that 
Germany would now be an exemplar of stable democracy? Among the 15 current 
member states of the European Union, less than half can claim an uninterrupted 
history of democracy extending back before the Second World. France has had 




























































































Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland—have institutionalized new 
democratic regimes since the end of the war.
At a minimum, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have moved 
away from the totalitarian aspirations of a Soviet-style Communist party state. In 
its annual review of freedom on every continent, Freedom House (1994: 20) 
describes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as free, 
and Romania and Slovakia as 'partly free'. All seven countries are classified as 
much freer today than five years ago. Free competitive elections were introduced 
throughout the region in 1990 (White, 1990), and each country has now held at 
least two free competitive elections. As a result of swings in electoral or 
parliamentary support, control of government now changes hands peacefully in 
the majority of Central and East European countries. Such a change of 
government did not occur in the Federal Republic of Germany until 20 years 
after it was founded, in the Fifth French Republic until 23 years after foundation 
and in Italy the Christian Democrats were continuously in office and the second 
largest party continuously excluded until the debacle of established parties in 
1994.
Democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for membership in 
the European Union. To participate in the Single Europe Market, a country must 
have a functioning market economy. Post-Communist societies have found it a 
more difficult and slower task to introduce the institutions needed for a market 
economy than to introduce free elections. Applicants must also accept the acquis 
communitaire. For this to happen, the member states of the EU must agree on 




























































































ready for membership. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference is intended to 
address this point. While the initial purpose of the IGC was to address problems 
of deepening the commitment of existing members, the issues-the Common 
Agricultural Policy, fiscal affairs, EMU, voting rights, military security and 
"two-speed" or "variable" forms of commitment—have major implications for 
dealings with Central and East European countries too.
Hence, this article first poses and answers the question: What_are Jlje 
chances for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?1 The first section 
presents the arguments of doubters; the second and third sections present fresh 
empirical evidence of surveys of public opinion throughout the region. Given 
that the democratic precondition is met, the second purpose is to consider: What 
are the real obstacles to enlargement? The two concluding sections focus on the 
problems of introducing a market economy in place of a command economy, and 
the difficulties that current EU members face in defining the post-1996 acquis 
communitaire
I CAUSES FOR CONCERN?
In distant times the lands of Central and Eastern Europe were ruled as part 
of authoritarian Russian, Ottoman, Habsburg and Prussian empires. Between the 
wars, the norm was a short experiment with semi-free elections, followed by an 
authoritarian takeover. Among the states examined here, only Czechoslovakia 
could claim to have established a democratic regime prior to the outbreak of the 





























































































Votes for ex-communists In democratizing regimes, free competitive 
elections not only determine which parties win the most seats in Parliament, but 
also show how much or how little popular support there is for anti-democratic 
parties. In such long-established democracies as Britain and Scandinavia, fascist 
and communist parties consistently receive very few votes.
In the first post-Communist elections of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Communist label and symbols were voluntarily abandoned by those who had 
previously been party leaders and activists. But no country has forbidden ex- 
Communists to vote or engage in party politics. Parties are formed by ex- 
Communists, drawings upon their organizational and. financial resources, 
networks and personal skills. It is significant that they choose to be described as 
ex-Communists rather than to keep the name of the old party alive.
Electoral support for parties of ex-Communists has varied greatly from 
country to country. The fragmentation of votes among many parties is a caution 
against confusing a relatively 'big' party with a majority party. Electoral systems 
have often produced very disproportional results in the award of parliamentary 
seats, sometimes to the benefit of parties of ex-Communists.
In three countries ex-Communist parties are playing a significant role in 
the formation of governments. In Bulgaria) the Socialist Party has averaged 41 
per cent of the vote in the three post-Communist elections. In Poland) the ex- 
Communist Democratic Left and the Peasants' Party together won 21 per cent of 




























































































of the day, in 1993 the two parties together won 36 per cent of the vote. The 
mechanics of a very disproportional PR electoral system converted this into 66 
per cent of the seats. In flungar^. the Socialist Party won 11 per cent of the vote 
in 1990 and in 1994 it won the largest share of the popular vote, 33 per cent. 
With a lower share of the vote than the Labour Party took at the 1992 British 
general election, the Socialists managed to take 54 per cent of the seats in 
Parliament.
In Czechoslovakia the Communist Party won 14 per cent of the vote in the 
1990 election of the Chamber of the People. In 1992 the Left Block won 14 per 
cent of the vote in the Czech Republic and the Party of the Democratic Left 
(SDL) a similar amount in the Slovak Republic. Insofar as there are threats to 
democracy in Slovakia they are more likely to come from nationalist than 
Communist sources. In the October, 1994 Slovak election, a party of ex- 
Communists, Common Choice, came second with 10 per cent of the vote. In 
Slovenia, the special circumstances of the break up of Yugoslavia has made party 
ideology less important than attitudes toward Belgrade. In the 1992 
parliamentary election, the United League of ex-Yugoslav Communists won 14 
per cent of the vote. In Romania the personalistic or Sultanistic character of 
Ceausescu’s rule encouraged dissent among members of the national Communist 
party. There too threats to democracy are more likely to come from traditional 
nationalist and authoritarian tendencies than from Marxist-Leninist legacies.
East Germany is sometimes cited as if it were an example of Communist 
revival, because of support for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). In fact, 




























































































Federal Republic because it only contests seats in the five laender of the old 
German Democratic Republic. In 1990 it won only 11 per cent of the vote in that 
region, 2 per cent of the total for Germany as a whole. In 1994 the regional PDS 
vote doubled to 22 per cent as it campaigned on regional grievances, exactly the 
opposite of the behaviour of an internationalist Marxist-Leninist party. The PDS 
remains small at the national level, nor has it called forth a rightwing reactionary 
party in West Germany. While it is correct to say that East Germans do see the 
collapse of Communism differently from West Germans, in fact a major 
difference is that East Germans see re-unification as greatly improving their 
economic prospects, and simultaneously giving them a better political regime 
(see Rose and Page, 1996).
Where parties of ex-Communists have been successful in winning 
elections, they have not done so by promising a return to a Communist regime 
but by promising more effective government within the framework -o£ plural ist 
elections and freedoms. When a government of inexperienced politicians runs 
into difficulties, ex-Communists point to their experience of office. In Hungary, 
the Socialist leader, Gyula Horn, campaigned against a conservative government 
by proclaiming: 'Let the experts govern' (Barber, 1994). Within a year, his own 
government split when confronted by persisting economic difficulties. In Poland 
President Walesa has been able to exploit differences among ex-Communists. In 
a competitive party system, ex-Communists must learn new tricks in order to 
survive.
Economic transformation. Marxists believed that the collapse of a 




























































































collapse of Communist political regimes has produced an economic counter­
revolution, as the power of the bureaucratic commanders of the command 
economy was broken (cf. Komai, 1992). Post-Communist countries are now in 
the throes of economic transformation. In this process, costs come before 
benefits. To paraphrase Lenin, "You can't introduce a market economy without 
breaking eggs". The results are evident at both the macro-economic and the 
household level (cf. World Bank, 1993). They include:
Official statistics record the double-digit contraction of the official 
economy since 1990 (World Bank, 1993). On the basis of official statistics, 
Lawrence Summers (1992: 25ff) has compared per capita income in Central and 
Eastern Europe as between Argentine and Korea today, or at the level of the 
United States in 1900. His 'conservative' estimate is that these countries will not 
see their per capita income return to the 1989 level for seven to ten years (that is, 
1996) and not regain their position relative to expanding West European 
economies until about 2005. Even if these numbers are discounted as 
inadequately taking into account "unofficial" economic activity, there has almost 
certainly been some loss of output and substantial economic dislocations 
(Holzmann et al., 1995).
Treble digit inflation has been the norm. When inflation rates are 
calculated for a two or three year period, the cumulative effect can be quadruple 
or even quintuple digit inflation. Quoting inflation rates in monthly terms does 
not alter the underlying arithmetic: a 20 per cent monthly rate compounds into an 
annual inflation of 1,070 percent. If the rate then falls to 'only' 10 percent a 




























































































Unemployment is a rising threat- A nonm arket pm n n m y  could offer a lrtw— 
paid job for life, hut an economy.in-transformation.-necessarily,-reqnires-labout 
mobility.-Insofar as enterprises traditionally relied upon overemployment, then 
one step toward efficiency is to shed labour. If that does not work, then forced 
down-sizing or bankruptcy can make people unemployed. Reported 
unemployment rates in Central and Eastern Europe today are no higher (and 
sometimes lower) than in OECD countries. But people in employment are in a 
far more precarious situation, for even if they do not lose their job, the wages 
they are paid may badly deteriorate in value.
II POPULAR EVALUATION OF NEW REGIMES
If Central and East Europeans remain committed to authoritarian 
traditions, if economic difficulties invariably lead to the rise of undemocratic 
regimes and if Communists are unyielding adherents of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrines, the European Union would become, on its own or in conjunction with 
NATO, a bastion of democracy in a still-divided continent. But are Central and 
East Europeans voting for a return to the authoritarian and anti-market regim e o f ., 
the past forty years?' Or are ex-( 
political opportunists?__ _
In an open society there is a straightforward way to assess the chances of 
democracy :f Ask The people* A democracy cannot exist unless it is freely 
supported by the bulk of the population. Furthermore, most predictions of the 




























































































suspending Parliament and introducing authoritarian governance with the tacit 
support of a majority.
To monitor popular response to transition, the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, 
Vienna, has established the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), a unique 
annual survey of political attitudes and economic behaviour in post-Communist 
countries. The data reported here come from the third annual New Democracies 
Barometer, financed by the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research and the 
Austrian National Bank. It asks the same questions of nationwide stratified 
representative samples averaging one thousand respondents across Central and 
Eastern Europe. The results here are for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and Slovenia.2 The results reported here are for 
7,020 face-to-face interviews. Fieldwork was conducted between late November, 
1993 and early April, 1994 (for full details, see Rose and Haerpfer, 1994). To 
assist generalization, the following tables also report a New Democracies mean, 
calculated by averaging the responses from all seven countries, weighting each as 
equal in size. The first two tables also give results for East Germany from a 
spring, 1993 representative sample survey of 1,117 East Germans (see Rose, 
Zapfetal., 1993).
Erom a state-centric perspective, the key question is the stability of .a- 
regime. I f  a regime is unlikely to last for more than a few years, it would be, 
imprudent for any country to agree a long-term treaty commitment. EU 
negotiators also have a second concern: whether or not there is likely to be a 
democratic regime. A democratic regime necessarily depends upon a substantial 




























































































By definition, everyone in an ex-Communist society has lived under at 
least two different regimes, and older people have lived under three or even 
more. For people who, have lived most Q ftheir.frvesinaComrnunist state, the 
starting point for evaluating any post-Communist regime is the-pastr-Today, 
citizens of the new democracies are able to compare a regime in which the party, 
not the people, was the ultimate arbiter, and a pluralistic political system as it 
actually is. Such a system is bound to have defects. As Winston Churchill (1947) 
once told the House of Common: 'No one pretends that democracy is perfect or 
all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.'
The New Democracies Barometer asked people to evaluate regimes on a 
vertical "heaven/hell" scale running from +100 to -100. Allowing for minus as 
well as plus ratings is important, for people can thus indicate whether both 
regimes are acceptable or both undesirable, with one being less unsatisfactory 
than the other. The question asked was: 'Here is a scale for ranking how the 
government works. The top, plus 100, is the best; at the bottom, minus 100, is the 
worst. Where on this scale would you put: a) the former communist regime b) 
our present system o f  governing with free elections and many parties? c) our 
system o f governing in five years time?' A parallel question was asked about 
economic systems.
Comparing past and present. When asked to rate the former Communist 
regime, Central and East Europeans divide: the majority are negative, but 41 per 




























































































proportion is found in the Czech Republic, where Soviet repression was 
particularly evident. East Germans and Slovenes come second in the low level of 
support for the old regime. The highest rating is found in Hungary, reflecting the 
fact that the old regime was not so much based on repression as on hypocrisy. In 
Janos Kadar's phrase, 'He who is not against us is with us'. The relatively high 
level of endorsement in Slovakia is likely to reflect some Slovaks preferring to be 
part of Czechoslovakia.
When people are asked to rate the former economic system, the overall 
pattern is positive: 60 per cent give it a favourable rating (Table 3). Hungarians 
and Slovaks are very heavily positive about the old economic system. East 
Germans, who were relatively well off compared to other command economies 
in the old days, are most likely to see the old economic system as unfavourable, 
since they can now compare it with life in the prosperous social market economy 
of the Federal Republic. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia, now the most 
prosperous post-Communist economies, less than half also endorse the old 
economic system. In sum, the median person liked the security of the old 
economy but not the repressive politics that accompanied it.
(Tables 1 and 2 about here)
When people are asked to rate their new political system, a clear majority- 
are positive; an average of 61 per cent endorse their new regime. Especially 
positive groups are found in the Czech Republic and Poland, where repression 
had been harsh under an alien Communist regime. However, when people are 
asked about the new economic system, which has delivered inflation and rising 
unemployment as well as new goods to the shops, the majority are negative. 




























































































points compared to evaluations of the planned economy. East Germans are 
average in their positive response to the new political system. In rating the 
economic transformation, they are deviant in keeping with their deviant 
experience of having costs met by the revenues of the Federal Republic of 
Germany: 75 per cent are positive about the social market economic system of 
the Federal Republic, almost double the proportion in economic systems in 
transformation.
If people prefer the new regime to the old regime and are optimistic about 
the future, the chances for democracy^ look good. But if people prefer the old to 
the new and are pessimistic about the future then the prospects are high for 
regimes to take a right or left turn away from democratization. Central and East 
Europeans have a mixed view of their world—but the mix is different than before. 
Today, the median person is positive about the political system and negative 
about the economic system. Combining the evaluations that people give about 
the past and present political systems yields a fourfold typology of responses to 
transformation (cf. Rose and Mishler, 1994).4
*Democrats (disapprove Communist regime, approve new: 37%). This is 
the largest and most positive group. Their average rating of the old regime 
on the heaven/hell scale was minus 57; their average rating of the new 
regime is plus 44.
* Sceptics (disapprove both regimes: 21%). Sceptics view their present 
political system negatively. But they also view the old Communist regime 




























































































scale. Following Churchill's dictum, the present is preferred as a lesser evil 
than the past.
*Compliant (approve both Communist, new regimes: 22%). Given a 
history of authoritarian pressures to bow to the powerful, it is not 
surprising that some Central and East Europeans will endorse both old and 
new regimes. The mean rating is identical for the Communist regime and 
the current regime (plus 45 points on the scale).
* Reactionaries (approve Communist regime, dislike new: 18%). This 
group is the mirror image of the democrats. The mean rating given the 
Communist regime on the heaven/hell scale is plus 55 and the rating for 
the new regime is minus 41. It differs in being almost a third smaller in 
size than the democrats.
The hig. henefits that the new regimes of Central and.Eastern Europe have 
delivered are political. The great majority now feel much freer in their everyday- 
life (Table 3). When the New Democracies Barometer asked people to compare 
conditions on six different measures of freedom, countries differ only in the size 
of the majority feeling freer today. Instead of being lectured about the dangers of 
religion as the "opiate of the people", people feel freer to decide for themselves 
about going to church. Instead of being forced to take part in the "non-politics" of 
the Communist Party, people feel free to turn their backs on participating in party 
politics. The biggest gains in freedom are not in the societies closest to Western 
standards but in societies that Communists dragged toward Oriental despotism, 
such as Romania. There nine-tenths now feel freer than in Ceausescu's regime. 




























































































proportion of East Germans also report a much higher sense of freedom. The 
same is true for Russians in Estonia and Latvia (Rose, 1995: Figures 2, 3).
Central and East Europeans today. The pessimists fear that the future jnay 
resemble the past; the optimists h o p e  th a t the^ .Q .^s.o { lah an d o n iag u 3 n e^ y stem .iQ r.^  
a n o th e r  wil| produce b e n e fits  in f u tu r e -Five years is a period in which a great 
deal can happen; for example, a survey such as the New Democracies Barometer 
could not have been conducted in 1989. Hence, the Barometer asked people to 
evaluate what they believe their country will be like five years from now.
Expectations n l l t h e  fu tu re  help us understand the direction in which 
sceptics _and—reactionaries arp moving— if groups currently negative about 
democratizing regimes were also negative about the future, then post-Communist 
societies would be headed for political polarization of a sort that led to the 
destruction of the Fourth French Republic and crippled the Republic of Italy. 
Alternatively, those who are currently negative may simply be laggards in 
accepting change. In fact, those not currently in favour of the new regime are 
laggards rather than confirmed anti-democrats. The average reactionary expects 
to come around to support the new regime, and so too does the average sceptic 
(for details, see Rose and Mishler, 1994).
CgntraLand East Europeans are very positive about the political future: 78 
per cent give a positiv:e. ninir3.4(r4hc.-reuim£i.as.lhe.v expprt it to he (T^ble 1). 
Political optimism is high not only in the Czech Republic, but also in Romania 
and Bulgaria, where an undemocratic Balkan past looms large. Notwithstanding 
nostalgia, the great majority of Hungarians are prepared to be optimistic about
(Table 3 about here)




























































































the future. Expectations of the future economy are positive too; 70 per cent 
expect it to be satisfactory in five years. Here again the Czechs are most positive 
about the future, followed by East Germans. The majority positive about the 
future of the economy is not as large as that for the new political regime, but it is 
high enough to show there is support for both elements in the double 
transformation of Communist societies into democracies and market economies. 
Moreover, the gap between political and economic evaluations shows that it is 
fallacious to infer political evaluations from current economic conditions.
Ill SUPPORT FOR ALTERNATIVES TO DEMOCRACY
The consolidation of democracy does not require 100 per cent popular 
endorsement of the regime, for total agreement is not possible in politics. 
Moreover, free elections offer openings to parties that may oppose the regime. 
The critical point, as studies of democratization in Mediterranean Europe 
emphasize (see Gunther, 1995), is that, like it or not, all politically significant. 
groups accept a democratic political system as the regime within which they seek ' 
office and resolve their disputes. Fulf institutionalizatioh, that is, virtually 
unanimous support for the new regime and the disappearance of anti-regime 
parties, can come later. As studies of democratization in the postwar Federal 
Republic of Germany have demonstrated, the institutionalization of regime 
support in the mass population can take decades (Weil, 1989).
In post-Communist countries, potential threats to democracy could come 
from popular support for some kind of authoritarian regime or individuals 
continuing to hold Communist values even in the absence of a Communist party. 




























































































Alternative regimes. Since everyone in a post-Communist society has 
lived under at least two different regimes, it is meaningful to ask people whether 
they think they would be better off with another system of government (Table 4). 
A question about the monarchy was included, even in countries which had no 
royal family between the wars, as a check on the possibility of people being so 
alienated as to endorse anything. In countries with a republican tradition only a 
handful endorsed this alternative. In Bulgaria and Romania, where there were 
monarchs between the wars, less than one-fifth endorsed return to such a system.
Communist rule is rejected by 85 per cent of New Democracies Barometer 
respondents. F.ven in Bulgaria, where an ex-Communist party has successfully 
adapted to competitive party politics, only one-quarter endorse a return to a 
regime run as Communists used to govern. Opponents are much more intense 
than proponents of the old regime. In the seven countries examined here, only 
four per cent strongly endorsed a return to Communist rule, whereas 60 percent 
are strongly against a return. The low level of demand for a return to Communist 
rule shows that the minority approving the old regime (Table 1) are no longer 
actively reactionary, wanting to turn the clock back. Only 11 per cent give the 
Communist regime a positive rating and would like to see it back. More than 
two-thirds of those favourable toward the old regime are simply nostalgic about 
the security and order of the past without wanting the regimentation and controls 
that went with it.
(Table 4 about here)
In many parts of the world military rule is an alternative to democracy. 




























































































society the army ranked third in trust, well ahead of Parliament and political 
parties. Yet only 9 per cent would welcome the army governing their country. 
The rejection of the military is consistent with the doctrine of Communist 
regimes, which trained soldiers to see their role as fighting a global war rather 
than to enforce internal order or modernize society, tasks of the Communist 
Party.
The demand for effective leadership is not necessarily undemocratic: it can 
be heard in every American presidential election and in Western Europe too. 
However, given the history of Central and Eastern Europe, an effective leader 
may not be a democrat. Among NDB respondents, 30 percent endorsed a strong 
leader. Disagreement about who the strong leader should be would weaken the 
mass base of support for a particular dictator. Furthermore, many who favour a 
strong leader do so because they want more effective government; their ideal is a 
representative Parliament and a strong executive. Overall, only 12 per cent 
favour a strong leader and the abolition of Parliament (see Rose and Mishler, 
1994a).
The prime problem facing every Central and East European country today 
is the transformation of the economic system from a command to a market 
economy. This is often defined by a technical problem by international advisors 
and by the economics profession. Elected politicians may accept allowing 
economists to make decisions in the belief that economics is an applied science, 
and they lack knowledge of what to do. Or they may push expert economists into 




























































































When people are asked if they would like the most important decisions 
about the economy to be made by experts and not elected politicians, there is 
very strong support in every country for a technocratic solution to current 
economic difficulties. The fact that 71 percent endorse decisionmaking by 
experts does not mean that PhDs from MIT are going to supplant commissars as 
the new ruling elite. The definition of an expert is not based on professional 
credentials but pragmatic: an expert is a person who can successfully address the 
country's economic problems.
The values of ex-Communists? Communist parties concurrently pursued 
two goals: they sought to indoctrinate the mass of the population ip Mandst- 
Leninist doctrines. Party propaganda was pervasive in sogjgty^Jji addition, 
Communist regimes were mobilization regimes. The intent was to make each 
nation's Communist Party a broad church of true believers, and not just an 
ideological sect. In consequence, there are now tens of millions of former 
members of the Communist Party in Central and East Europe today. When the 
Soviet Army withdrew after 1989, virtually no Communist left his or her 
country. This leads to the paradoxical question: How Communist were the 
Communists?
The greater the size of Communist Party membership^ the-more its- 
.members were likely, ta  be...a cross-section of the population as a whole. 
Communist organizations made a special effort to recruit members on the 
grounds of social representativeness rather than sophisticated ideological 
knowledge. In every Western country for which there is survey evidence, the 




























































































ideologue. Moreover, in Communist societies there were many motives for 
individuals to join the Communist Party: the need to have a party card to get a 
position or a promotion, a liking for social activities or holding an official status, 
an inclination to participate in many kinds of voluntary associations, idealistic 
belief in simple shibboleths or a commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology 
(White and McAllister, forthcoming).
Insofar as the Communist Party attracted members on ideological grounds, 
then the hypothesises: the. political views o f ex-Communists should be very 
different from other members o f society today, as those who silently or sullenly 
refrained from joining the party are now free to express their own attitudes. But 
insofar as people joined the party for opportunistic reasons or viewed politics in 
pragmatic terms, then the opposite hypothesis should hold: the political views o f 
ex-Communist should not differ from those o f other members o f society.5
Given that party membership was usually not secret in Communist 
societies, the New Democracies Barometer found no hesitancy in people 
answering questions about it. Across the countries surveyed, 16 per cent said that 
they had belonged to the party or one of its associated organizations and an 
additional 18 per cent said that a member of their family had belonged to the 
party. Overall, more than a third could be described as being ex-Communists or 
having a Communist family background.
It appears that mass recruitment to the Communist Party was self- 
defeating ideologically. When comparisons are made across the eleven questions 




























































































who joined the party today hold similar views to non-Communists. Both groups 
are virtually identical in their readiness to endorse the current political regime 
and in their hopes for the future. While ex-Communists are more in favour of the 
old regime it is by only a limited margin. Ex-Communists are likely to approve 
the old economic system and disapprove the present way of running the 
economy, but the same is true of non-Communists. Both groups are similarly 
hopeful about the future.
(Table 5 about here)
Ex-Communists are as ready as non-Communists to support the_ 
dern_Q£ratie ''fules of the game". T he fall of anoldregim&ylaees-fbrmer rulers in 
oppositloxu giying them an incentive to respect rules that give thosc-out-of office . 
all the rights that oppositions have in established democracies (see di Palma, 
1990). The proportion who would approve the suspension of Parliament is 
actually four percentage points lower than among non-Communists, and the 
proportion endorsing a strong leader is six percentage points lower. More than 
four-fifths of ex-Communists say that they now feel freer to say what they think.
It is also striking that more than four-fifths of ex-Communists do not endorse a 
return to Communist rule.
Whatever the chances of democracy, the likelihood of a return to 
Communism in the countries reviewed here is almost nil, for the institutions that 
introduced and sustained Communism in Central and Eastern Europe—the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—no longer exist. The oldest— 
generations are most likely to be nostalgic about the old regime. In-Central and 
Eastern Europe 49 per cent of the generation bom before 1933 endorse the old 




























































































(Rose and Camaghan, 1995: Table 2). As the most pro-Communist cohort dies, 
the balance of the population will tip, creating a society dominated by the post- 
Communist generations.
It can be argued that the views voiced today by self-described ex- 
Communists are different from what they would have said five years ago. This 
implies that people joined the Communist party so as to advance their own 
interests, and 'Once an opportunist, always an opportunist. (Cf. Schumpeter's 
(1952: 282f) dictum that parties are like garment manufacturers, producing 
policies according tQ what appeak-to-their customers:) From this perspective, 
changing the political regime becomes sufficient to turn Communists into 
democrats, because it creates new incentives. It also imposes penalties for 
holding to past beliefs and practices. The problem, of ex-Communists is not 
proving their commitment to the welfare state but in proving their commitment to 
liberal -democratic. vahiesJCitschelfs (1995) interviews with party elites in 
Central Europe show that they are now trying to do so.
IV OBSTACLES TO ENLARGEMENT WITHIN POST-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES
While post-Communist publics may be similar in their political 
preferences, there are differences between states, not least in their approach to the 
European Union. Such differences are most obvious between the four Visegrad 
countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—and other post- 
Communist states in the region. Differences can also be found between and 




























































































substantial economic differences among post-Communist countries, whether the 
measure is officially recorded GDP or real material measures, such as cars or 
colour television sets.
The best off countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, are not 
so well off materially as the best off countries in the European Union. However, 
their living standards do not differ so much from the least well off EU member 
states, such as Portugal and Greece. The entry of the Czech Republic or Poland 
into the European Union does not require the achievement of German or Danish 
living standards. The majority of present member states of the Union have not 
done this. Every volume of Eurostat documents very big differences in material 
achievements among the fifteen member states of the Union.
market, there is agreement that .some. kind of market economy is. necessary. The 
move toward a Single European Market has increased the pressures for member- 
states to have market institutions that are in harmony, even if not identical. In 
order for post-Communist societies to participate fully and positively in the 
European Union, they must have market economies too. For a country to join the 
European Union without laws of property, commercial banks, market prices, 
systems for clearing goods through customs quickly, etc., etc., would invite 
national disaster.
:. While there is no agreement within
o f  e c o n o m y  is  a " f r e e "  o r  a " s n r ia l "
Cgntral and East European countries are seeking to introduce market 




























































































dramatic falls in measured official output, appears to have created in reaction a 
demand to reduce inflation and to have forced enterprises to become market- 
oriented. The process has now gone far enough so that it would be impossible for 
the institutions of the old command economy to be re-introduced. But creating 
the institutions and cadres of a modem market economy appears a much slower 
task than creating a pluralistic democracy. The mechanisms that individuals used 
to 'get by' in a command economy, such as growing food for home consumption, 
exchanging help in house repair with friends or working for the untaxed 'cash in 
hand' second economy, helps people avoid destitution, but does not lay the 
groundwork for enterprises that can operate in the single market (cf. Rose, 1993).
The legacy of Communism is a lack of many basic institutions of a 
.modem market economy, such as a price system that reflected market factors, 
stable central bank and commercial banks, fixed laws of property and contract, a 
stock exchange, lawyers and accountancy firms, profit-oriented enterprise 
managers and exporters and administrators of firms in bankruptcy. Importing 
Westerners and Western techniques is inadequate, for outsiders are not trained to 
deal with the origins of problems in economies in transformation. In Britain, 
privatization could occur easily because there was already a private sector there, 
with sophisticated capital market institutions, small and large savers, and 
meaningful rather than misleading balance sheets and profit and loss statements. 
In the early days of transition there was a rush to "privatization without the 
private sector". Logically, to deal with these requires "transformation" managers, 
accountants and lawyers, people who understand both the old ways and new or 




























































































The problems of creating new institutions in a wreckage of a command 
economy are a reminder that institutions taken for grantor! in thp *
generations to evolve. Without such institutions, a Single Europe Market cannot 
exist. It is in the interests of Central and East Europeans to construct such 
institutions for their own national wellbeing. It is even more in their interest to 
have such institutions well established before their manufacturing and service 
industries must face the full force of competition from the current member states 
of the EU.
Injsociai conditions, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe~are-n©t~ 
backward. Literacy is complete, secondary education is common and tertiary 
education widespread. The contrast in human capital between Poland before the 
war, in the 1950s and today is extreme, just as it is between Italy or France over a 
similar length of time. None of the post-Communist countries reviewed here has 
labour force participation rates for women as low as those in the United 
Kingdom, Germany or Italy. In infant mortality, East Germany, Latvia and 
Lithuania in 1990 had already achieved a level as good as that of the threshold 
(that is, lowest-ranking) European Union country. Infant mortality is higher in 
other countries but as long as rates of progress can be maintained and any 
setbacks are not permanent, it is only a matter of time before infant mortality 
catches up with the current European Union threshold, or surpasses it. In gender 
equality in employment, Central and East European countries are actually ahead 
of European Union countries. There were 85 women employed for every 100 
men in work in the median country there in 1990, compared to 68 per 100 in the 
median European Union country at that time, a difference not eroded by 




























































































What idea of Europe? The founders of the European Community had an 
idea of the Europe that they wished to create, and of a past that they wished to 
leave behind. Such ideals can never be completely realized, but they are political 
facts of first importance. As John Major demonstrates, the absence of any ideal is 
also important. In Central and East European lands invaded by Soviet troops at 
the end of the Second World War joining the European Union was not available 
as an ideal, but governments there are now adopting Europe as a policy goal. But 
what idea do Central and East Europeans have of a Brussels-based Europe?
Public opinion surveys consistently show a low level of interest or 
knowledge about the European Union. -The Central and Eastern European 
EuroBarometer (European Commission, 1993, Annex 29, 33 and 34) found that 
among for the seven countries examined here:
*Had heard of European Community or Common Market 79% 
*Interested in European Community 36%
*Can name a city in which EC has major institutions 
19%
When Central and East Europeans are asked to evaluate European Union 
institutions, 53 per cent say they have neither a positive nor a negative 
impression of its aims and activities (Rose and Haerpfer, 1994: Q. 80). This is 
hardly surprising, given the low level of popular interest in European Union 
affairs. Among the minority with an impression, an average of 37 per cent 




























































































The low level of interest and knowledge about the_-Eumpe»rr 14mon_is_ji 
strong caution in interpreting current surveys showing that 52 per cent of Central 
and Eastern Europeans are 'somewhat. inJkvour' of their country becoming a 
member of the European TJnion, and only 10 per cent express negative views 
(Rose and Haerpfer, 1994: Q. 81). The Maastricht referendums are a reminder 
that a referendum campaign is likely to produce a much more even division of 
voters than are surveys taken when the European Union is not a salient issue.
To focus-on. links between post-Communist countries and the European 
Union distorts the way in which peoples in Central.and Eastern. Europe see the 
world. The fact that people may be uninformed and uninterested in Europe qua 
Brussels does not mean that they are isolationist or parochial. When the Central 
and East European Barometer asks people to identify countries with which their 
future lies, a variety are named, including the United States. The orientation 
toward foreign countries is fragmented rather than focused on the European 
Union. Moreover, the answers vary with the geography and historic ties of the 
country (cf. European Commission, 1994: Figure 7, Annex Figures 10-13).
Wien Central and Eastern Europeans are asked whether they think their 
country should develop according to its own national traditions and values or 
followthose of West European countries, .the majority give a patriotic response, 
endorsing their own national traditions (Table 6). Only in Slovenia do a majority 
turn to the West, almost certainly a rejection of their past as part of the 
Yugoslavia. The orientation to Western Europe is low in the Czech Republic as it 
is in Bulgaria. The assertion of national traditions and values is not unique to one 




























































































minted g£U, and a re-assertion of the idea of a Europe des patries (cf. Dahl, 1994 
and Wallace, 1995).
(Table 6 about here)
The rejection of West European values is not a rejection of European 
values per se. People in Cracow can claim that they are just as much defenders of 
European civilization as are the people of Denmark or Spain, and Prague is more 
at the center of Europe than Dublin or Lisbon. In affirming national traditions 
people can be expressing a sense of a different Europe, in which the Danube not 
the Rhine is the main waterway.6 The European Union has a changing definition 
of Europe too. The accession of Finland, Sweden and Austria is a major step to 
the East. Further enlargement will not only have an impact upon peoples in post- 
Communist countries but also affect how the present member states of the Union 
define Europe.
V THE EU OBSTACLE: DEFINING THE ACQUIS COMMUNITAIRE
If post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe are to be admitted 
to the European Union, the current members must be willing to accept their 
applications. Their current status can be described as "not unacceptable", for the 
associated countries have taken major strides since 1990 toward consolidating 
pluralistic political institutions. Countries selected for associate status are not 
without problems, but this is true of every democratic political system. Racism is 
a pan-European phenomenon, as witness the vote for LePen in France, and ethnic 
conflict in Northern Ireland has resulted in more violent deaths within the United 
Kingdom than in the transition from Communist rule to pluralistic democracy in 




























































































Public opinion within the European Union is also not a barrier to 
enlargement; the preponderant view is positive or indifferent rather than 
negative. A survey by the Harris Research Centre (1994) shortly before the 1994 
European Parliament election found an average of 50 per cent supported the idea 
of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland becoming members of the 
European Union, as against 30 per cent disapproving and 20 per cent with no 
opinion. Such data are best treated as showing a permissive public attitude as far 
as enlargement is concerned.
What will be the new acquis communitaire? To become a member, a 
country must accept the acquis communitaire. But countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe cannot agree to this until the current member states decide what it 
will be. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Council is intended to address this issue. 
Member states will simultaneously deal with issues left open in the Maastricht 
Treaty and anticipate issues that enlargement raises. Preparations indicate 
substantial divisions within and between national governments about the future 
direction of Europe.
The prospect of enlargement intensifies divisions that would exist if the 
Berlin Wall were still in place. These include disagreements about the existing 
Common Agricultural Policy, financial contributions by member states to the 
Union, the desirability or the feasibility of European monetary union, the rules 
for assigning votes and permitting vetoes by member states. The greater 
heterogeneity introduced into the Union by enlargement to the east will give 




























































































more divided than a 'two-speed' Europe. Future military security, inside or 
outside the European Union and with or without collaboration with the United 
States, is the only new issue raised by the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
Until the new acquis can be decided, there is nothing to be offered to 
countries expressing interest in joining the European Union. The Inter- 
Govemmental Conference is a starting point for facing these issues; agreement is 
unlikely to be reached by 31 December 1996. Whatever the extent of political 
progress in Central and Eastern Europe, at that time it is also unlikely that the 
institutions of a market economy will be fully functioning there.
To note that the future is open does not mean that the boundaries of 
Europe are static. Progress from a six-nation European Coal & Steel Community 
to a European Union shows that even though change is erratic and often slow, 
both enlargement and deepening occur. The abrupt transition to freedom in 
Central and Eastern Europe is a reminder of how quickly great changes may take 
place there. And even if no enlargement occurs in the foreseeable future, the 
states and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will not go away and cannot be 
ignored. The different parts of Europe are now interdependent, with or without 
sharing membership in the European Union, and this is clearest in the position of 
the richest and most powerful country in Central and Eastern Europe and of the 
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Table 1 EVALUATING POLITICAL REGIMES-PAST,PRESENT,FUTURE
Communist Current In five
regime regime years
(% rating positive)
Bulgaria 51 59 70
Czech Republic 23 78 88
Slovak Republic 50 52 79
Flungary 58 51 76
Poland 38 69 84
Romania 33 60 77
Slovenia 32 55 72
Mean 41 61 78
East Germany 32 60 64
Source: Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, New Democracies Barometer III. A 
multi-national survey conducted between late November, 1993 and early March, 
1994, sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research and 
the Austrian National Bank. Total number of respondents: 7,020. For full details, 
see R. Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New Democracies Barometer III (Glasgow: 
Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy No. 232). East German results from a spring, 





























































































Table 2 EVALUATING ECONOMIC SYSTEMS-PAST, PRESENT,FUTURE
Communist Transition In five
system system years 
(% rating positive)
Bulgaria 66 15 56
Czech Republic 42 66 86
Slovak Republic 74 31 73
Hungary 75 27 63
Poland 52 50 71
Romania 60 35 66
Slovenia 48 48 73
— . . . —
Mean 60 39 70
East Germany 36 75 82
Source: Paul Lazarsfeld Society, New Democracy Barometer III and 1993 East 



























































































Table 3 INCREASED FREEDOMS IN EAST EUROPEAN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES
Speech Join Travel No fear Interest
Religion
org. arrest politics
(% feeling more free now than under Communist regime)
Bulgaria 90 95 95 88 97 98
Czech Republic 84 90 96 73 84 94
Slovakia 82 88 88 62 80 96
Hungary 73 81 76 59 na 83
Poland 83 78 75 71 69 70
Romania 94 94 90 81 92 95
Slovenia 74 82 62 54 59 77
Mean 80 84 72 62 74 86




























































































Table 4 WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
BUL CZ SVK HUN POL ROM SLVE
NDB
mean
Return to Communist rule 25
(% endorsing)
6 16 17 18 12 12 15
Army should govern 14 2 4 2 11 19 8 9
Monarchy 19 3 2 5 6 18 na 9
Strong leader to decide 45 16 24 18 35 30 42 30
Experts not elected 66 79 89 82 60 57 63 71
politicians to decide economy




























































































Table 5 VALUES OF EX-COMMUNISTS AND NON-COMMUNISTS COMPARED
Ex-Com'st Com'st Non-Com'st Diffce 
in family
(% approving)
Communist political regime 48 38 36 12
Current political regime 60 61 63 3
Future political regime 77 81 78 1
Past economic system 68 59 54 14
Current economic system 34 39 44 10
Future economic system 69 73 72 3
More freedom now to say what think 82 85 85 3
Return to Communist rule 18 14 14 4
Strong leader to decide 28 27 34 6
Experts decide economy 66 69 70 \4
Approve suspension Parliament 21 22 25 4
(Questions cross-tabulated by replies to a question about whether the respondent or any member 
o f  his or her family had belonged to the Communist Party or an associated organization. 
Answers pooled for six Central and Eastern countries covered in Tables 1-4; party membership 
was not asked in Slovenia.)




























































































Table 6 ORIENTATION TO WESTERN EUROPE OR NATIONAL 
TRADITIONS?
Bulg Cz Hung Slvk Rom. Slovenia Mean 
(% endorsing each alternative)
National traditions, 63 63 59 57 52 33 54
values
Western Europe 35 36 35 41 47 65 43
No answer 2 1 5 2 2 2 3
Q. Do you think our country should develop like West European countries or 
should our country develop in keeping with our national traditions and values?






























































































1. Any definition of Central and Eastern Europe must exclude as well as include 
countries (see Rose, 1996: chapter 14). This is recognized by the Council o f Europe, 
which uses democracy as a criterion separating the region from the historic republics 
o f  the former Soviet Union. Successor states o f  Yugoslavia are, pro tempore, 
excluded, except for Slovenia, which is outside the war zone and a democracy. The 
inclusiveness o f  the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) arises 
from a desire to include nuclear powers and successor states o f  the USSR.
2. The New Democracies Barometer also included Croatia, Belarus and the 
Ukraine. As these countries are not recognized as potential candidates for membership 
in the EU in the near term, they are excluded here. The Baltic states o f  Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are also potential candidates for membership in the European Union. 
The very large Russian minorities introduced to Estonia and Latvia following the 
Second World War create substantial political complications there. For survey data on 
these countries, see Rose and Maley (1994).
3. Support for a democratic regime does not require every citizen to hold 
"democratic" values, however defined. For example, Gibson (1993: 949) has shown 
that on some measures democratic values are no greater among American blacks than 
among Russians whom he surveyed, and Miller (1995) has drawn a similar conclusion 




























































































4. Because o f  the deviant circumstances o f East Germany, it is excluded from 
most tables. For a more detailed analysis and comparison with West Germans, see 
Rose and Page (1996).
5. This hypothesis does not assume that Communist Party members are all o f one 
mind about democracy, an assumption that would deny political differences o f 
opinion. It simply states that divisions among Communists and among non- 
Communists should be similar.
6. Even on this, Central and East Europeans divide, for the river that flows 
through Prague proceeds via Germany to the North Sea, and states on the Baltic have 
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